Beginning with World War I1 and its aftermath, the area of ballistic vulncrabilitvllethalit).
INTRODUCTION
Beginning with World War I1 and its aftmath. the area of ballistic vulncrabilityllethality (V/L) was first dcfincd a a specific discipline within the field of ballistics. As the field developed. various practices and marks cmcrged. Grtainly the best-known metrics normally produced by the V/L community arc -PKs" or "Probability of Kills-'' Following the esti'hlishmcnt of Live-Fire regulation' in the l a s t dccade. thc concomitant issues of Live-Firc Tcst (LFT) stratcgics and model vcrificalion. validation. and accdimion (VV&A) have gained importance. lncrcarcd attention has bcen focused on V/L with the intcnt of bringing greater ngm-and clarity to the discipline. For example. some o f the V/L melrics used for many years and commonly rcfcrrcd to as "PKs" arc nu probabilities at all hut are a kind of expected-value utility function. constructed with the aim of describing the battle value of a damaged platform. However. long-standing practice in the wargame modeling communities has bcen to use thcsc numbers as probabilities.
The outcomes of actual live-fire field shots have often been assessed in terms of probabilities of kill, in spite of the fact that what has bcen observed is in fact a single outcome from a probability space. This practice is conceptually equivalent to reporting a football game Outcome after the fact in terms of a probability of win.
The particular focus of this report is on the proper coupling of V/L metrics with wargames and other emerging forms of distributed force-level simulation. Our purpose here is not to decry the methods and practices of our forebears, but rather to describe a logical set of steps associated with the practice of V/L, and how they now might be implemented in the emcrging world of increasingly powerful computers, high-level architectures, and distributed interactive simulations.
v/L FRAMEWORK
We recall that vulnerability generally refers to the assessment of damage and dysfunction visited on a blue (friendly) military platform. By contrast, lethality generally refers to the assessment of damage and dysfunction ori a red military platform. Starting about a decade ago, we have asserted that the study of vulnerability can be separated into four fully separable and 3 u e n t . d levels or spaces each connected with a mapping operator. These notions are explained in detail elsewhere? and we build upon those ideas here.
The totality of vulnerability can be partitioned among three kinds of descriptors: (1) damage to the target, (2) loss of platform (i.e., target) functional capability, and (3) reduction in battlefield utility. Each of these descriptors is characterized using the V/L Taxonomy abstraction.
Levels, Operators, and Mapping Abstraction
Figure 1 illustrates six levels (or mathematical spaces) labeled Level -11 through Level 41. Each Levcl represents distinct and separable classes of observables covering the gamut of weapons effectiveness. Each bullet in a Levcl represents a vector. which is characterized by a set of physical parameters. Thc composition of the vectors at each levcl is particular to the Level. A vector at one Level can be mapped to a vector at the next h v c l by an Opcrator. The operators are represented by the notation 0 , in which p represents the Level on which the input vector (v ) resides and q denotes the Levcl on which the output vector (v ) resides. Thus a vector at the p levcl can be written: P.9 P 9 v = o {v,)
P19
It is imporlant to undcrstand that the vector v has specific observable physical or engineering properties and is nor o probabilify. Howevcr. the operator 0 is normally stochastic. so probability distributions can be inferred by repetitively opcrating on a single v vector in order to generate a population of v vectors. 
OIP Mapping
For rasons thaf bccome clear later. we will start with Level I] as depicted in Fig. 1 
02,3 Mapping
As noted in Fig. 1 . the 0 , operator takes a Level 21 damage vector and maps it to a platform-level capability vector at lave1 3). Such VCCIOK are normally measurable quantities that relate directly to the ahility of the platform to support particular mission functions. We have posed this process in the context of a platform receiving its fist hit andfisr damage. In addition to the problematic way most current Level 41 metrics are constructed,m they are normally used as a basis for a random draw in the context of the wargame. If the draw is true, the vehicle is withdrawn from the game. If not, it continues undamaged. Multiple hits of like kind or damage from other threats (e.g., chemical, nuclear, electromagnetic) are all posd as PKs, under the assumption that no prior damage has occurred to the platform. These multiple hits are normally processed vi0 the Survivor Rule.' Thus, in addition to the individual metrics being flawed, combining a sequence of damages without regard to the fact that they have been each calculated using a pristine (i.e., undamaged) platform and combining damage without regard to the order in which it has occurred by aggregation are problematic.'
under scrutiny is located in a certain placdtime. A specific set of tactics and doctrine is in operation, and a specific * oo,, Mapping We have so far described the process of vulnerability beginning with Level 1). The V/L Taxonomy was Originally generated in ordcr to investigate the process of vulnerability. Standard practice in vulnerability is to arswne a particular warhead hit condition. This is why thc level for vulnerability initial conditions is labcled Level 11.
By ContraSt. lethality often includes a prefactor in vulnerability. the warhead hit dispersion. Thus in Fig. 1 , we haw addcd Imvcl O] to connow the warhead launch initial conditions and the operator 0,,1, which takes the warhead and m p u t o s the dispcrsion staiistics a s input (as needcd) to Level 11 for a subsequcnt 0 com5utation.
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o-r*O Mapping
For completeness. we have added Level -11. This is the level in which the inputs into the target detection and idcntification processes fit. The operator O-,,o takes the relevant initial conditions and maps them both to a decision to firc and the configuration o f the thrcit launchcr. contracting the number of vectors in the outcome levels. This behavior is illustrated on the right of Fig. 2 .
The overall picture one can gain from the process when repetitively sampled from top to bottom is one in which the population of vectors grows rapidly through Levels 01 through 21 and then contracts rapidly through Levels 31 and 41. The very magnitude in the population of the intermediate levels attests to the specific natuie of the vcctors at a given level and the way in which they feed into the ensuing operator. Clcariy. unless these statistics arc undcmood very well for the ranges of needed parameters. averaging at too low a level can place ensuing results in doubt.
Lethality Contrasted with Vulnerability
Previously we noted some typical differences between the way lethality and vulnerability arc normally construed. In Fig. 3 From the standpoint of platform survivability. vulnerability is shown as the end-game process beginning with the munition hit. Susceptibility can be viewed as all of the prior processes that lead to the hit initiation at Level 11. Survivability can be viewed as the e n d -t m d process in which susceptibility and vulnerability are combined.
One important manifestation of the difference in which these two communities view their need sets can be seen in the context of Live Fire. A Project Manager (PM) developing a new missile seeks assurance that the missile will be sufficiently lethal against a given target class. The need includes sufficient overkill so that future enemy countermeasures will not easily obviate weapon effectiveness. The details about the target damage or target function are probably not of great concern. By contrast, a PM developing a blue platform is likely to desire very specific information on both the damage (Level 21 information) as well as performance changes (Level 31 information) in order to t For exampk, the V/L Taxonomy illustrated in Fig. I 
PAST WARGAME EFFECTIVENESS PRACTICE
In what follows, we criticize past and existing practice concerning the representation of attrition in force-level combat models, simulations, and wargames. Fairness requires us to acknowledge, however, that much of what we find objectionable in current methods of attrition modeling was in the first instance promoted by mistakes and unclarities within the technical V/L community. In prior decades, the comparatively limited capabilities of computing hardwardsoftware contributed to pressures to keep methods simple. We have written concerning these problems elsewhere; the point here is to present a top-level view of the difficulties so that the relationship with the consequent problems with force-level attrition can be clearly seen.
As suggested previously in the INTRODUCTION, one of the early problems concerned lack of clarity in distinguishing probability of kill from the military utility of a system with other than full ca ability. We have criticized the identification of PK and utility in detail elsewhere Cor the cases of tank vulncrahility!' pcrsonnel vulnerability," and V/L issues for other classes of targets.12 Without repeating those arguments hcre. suffice it to say that questions and methods for dealing with our probability of winning the lottery are quitc diffcrcnt from those appropriate to evaluating the utility of holding a winning ticket.
We assert that our predecessors viewed the problem in the'following way. If vulnerability metrics were characterized as probabilities -even if mistakenly -significant advantages accrued. An aura of mathcmatical respectability was cast over what was an intrinsically flawed intellectual process. The probability calculus was made available as an instrument for numerical manipulation. In particular, one could multiply average hit probabilities by the average probability of kill given a hit values to obtain average single-shot kill probabilities (SSPKs). We can have both appropriate utility and mathematical consistency as well. There is a tonurcd history concerning the use of SSPKs that directly bears on the usual methods for transferring V/L information from technical data providers to force-level users. Before turning to that part of the story, however. let us dwell a bit longer on the internal intellectual problems with the technical V L community.
One of these problems is early averaging. Even if we put to one sidc the illcgiiimstc running togcthcr.of probabilities and utilities that the SSPK example illustrated. early averaging remains a problrm. S&e o f the problcms with use of averages as V/L metrics are just mistakes; in other cases. thc fault is nccdlcss loss of valuahlc inf'maPollard er 01.'~ made this mistake concerning LFT prediction and were criticized by stark^.'^ Another mistake is to average PK or SSPK over scenarios and other variables and then use that PK in a single one of those s e n a r i a : this is simply an inconsistency, and one that in many cases infects the traditional V/L to face-lcvcl handoff.
The problem of needlessly Iost information through early averaging can he panicularly fmstming for analysts who encounter it. This is so because. as the djscussion of the showed. the information lost was ncassarily at hand during an intermediate point in the computation. Suppose we arc conducting a study of armorcd vchiclcs whcm it is important to know the status of each sight. In Level 21 we clearly have a d m a p vcctoT that rcflccts whcthcr a given sight is functioning oc no^ If we drop this informaion aftcr we have U& it to calculruc an avcragc mobility or firepower utility. then it is obviously not available to answer specific questions a b u t sights. It may have tion. One mistake is to endeavor to compare the outcome of a tcst or simulruion cvent wi:h an avcragc probability. §
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14. been reasonable to drop such information in an era when large numbers of computer cycles and storage were less available than they are today; it is not reasonable or efficient to do so now.
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FORCELEVEL ISSUES
As indicated previously, Level 41 is concerned with military utility. A little reflection quickly shows that it is comparisons of systems with respect to military utility that allow toplevel procurement decisions to be made and this type of decision making. We do not try to rigidly define "military utility" here. Clearly, however, it has to do with prosecuting and winning engagements, battles, and wars. If the issue is readiness or tactical training, system procurement decision making, or examination of operational alternatives for achieving a strategic goal, then military utility, rather than a more narrowly drawn technical characteristic, is the proper metric for facilitating decisions.
We believe that military utility must be observed, measured, counted, or calculated in the context of actual or simulated force-level engagements, battles, and wars. This seemingly innocuous belief is in fact inconsistent with much of the past practie in the technical V/L arena. Recall that Level 41 metrics such as SSPK were taken as reflecting military utility and that they were calculated as a function of values for technical parameters. In some cases, these calculations involved weighting functions over tactical variables such as degree of target exposure. However, a laboratory scientist's choices concerning the variables to be considered or the weighting functions to be used, even if made with the advice and assistance of experienced soldiers, are unlikely to reflect the nuances, interconnections, and generalized fog of actual or adequately simulated combat. In fairness to our predecessors in the technical V/L world, some of the factors that caused them to pursue these unsatisfactory practices should be mentioned. First, for perfectly good and understandable reasons, Army decisionmakers craved analyses that illuminated military utility rather than narrower technical factors. Extant force-level models were not capable of using V/L metrics which were more complex. The generation of SSPKs was an attempt by the technical V/L community to respond to that demand, even if the attempt was intellectually misguided. Second. intellectually adequate combat simulations were simply not available until recently. (Some would argue that this overstates even our present capability.) Cerlainly through the 1970s. shortfalls in computer hardware capability and structumd programming techniques were impediments to achieving adequate simulation caEbility. This situation provided furlher motivation for the le~hnical V/L community to exceed its expertise and c l h questions of military utility as within its domain.
The As a specific example, we use an armored fighting vehicle such as a tank. This choice lcads to a particular set of missioncritical components. missioncritical capabilities. and finally minimal mission rquircments. However, this process can be applied to any military platform by appropriatcly tailoring the components. performance metrics, and mission requirements. 1 used to link properly to a notional wargame. Our problem is to examine the vulnerability and mission effectiveness Before any damage occurs, we can represent the (null) damage vector at Level 2) as:
The open squares ( o ) represent the various undamaged components on the platform including crew, ammo, mission critical, and other. In today's high-resolution V/L simulation~'~"~ a ground vehicle analysis utilizes on the order of lo3 such components.
We can group the components by category to give the Level 21 vector v2 the form:
Crew
Ammo Fuel
Miss Crit other
We now invoke the sequence of operators portrayed in Fig. 1 . We assume a shot is initiated at Level 0); the resulting munition hit point is computed and passed to Level 1). Next the 0 operator is used to compute a damage vector,
The effect of this action might be to transform the vector shown in Eq. (3) to the notional form: For example, if one of the components killed is the box providing IFFt support. then the corresponding capability at Level 3) is lost as well.
This vector can be expanded into a m m dctailcd expression of the form:
. .
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where M , is the vchicle Top Spccd. M , , is thc Maximum Range, M is the Rough Terrain capability, FRq, is the main-gun Rateof-Fire, FmA is the T r m e -t e A q u k (a target). F,, IS the Hit Dispcnion. C , is the Internal Commo Capability. and C , is the Extcmal Commo Capability. For descriptivc case. wc can choosc to rcprcsent thcse capability mctrics as a fraction of thc nominal (i.e.. undamaged) piatform mctrics. For the case of the lank being described. the capability vector of Eq. (6) can he illustratcd in Fig. 4 in which hfcfiility. Fircpower, and Communicaion functions are displayed.
In Fig. 4 (top) . thc three mevics of T q Spcd (Ts), Maximum Range OW). and Rough Tcnain (WT) capability are plottcd on normalized scales. Full-scale value implies design or undamaged csynhili:~. Thc p i n t a to each metric labeled AC indicate the postdamage platform Actual Capabilities. rcspeaivcly. Top Spaxi is at 80%. Maximum Range is at 80%. and Rough Terrain is at 60% of undamaged capability. Figure 4 (middle) illustrates three F i r e p e r metria. Rate-of-Fix (ROF). Time-teAquirc (TTA). and Hit Dispersion (HD). In this example the Actual Capability (AC) Rated-Fire is at 10096 of the undamaged valued. the Tune-@Acquire is al6096, and the Actual Hit Dispersion is at 20% of nominal value. This last metric corresponds to an increuse in munition hit dispersion. Note that the degraded performance capability described by J3q. (6) and illustrated in Fig. 4 arises as a direct consequence of the 0 operator operating on the non-null damage vector, v2, of Eq. (4)o As additional damage occurs to the platfom, the damage vector of Eq. (4) is further populated, and the platform capabilities represented by J Q . (6) continue to diminish. On the other hand, if battle damage repair is initiated, then at least some of the component entries of Eq. (4) move from dysfunctional to functional, and the related piatform capabilities of Eq. (6) increase. In other words, battle damage, whether initial or additional, populates the damage vector, v2, while battle damage repair acts to depopulate it.
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The Mission Mapping Operator. O,,,, has to do with military utility, as was suggested previously, and is in the province of the force-level analyst rather than the technical V/L analyst. From a slrategic point of view, there are two different lines of attack that historically have been followed to gah the objective of a crcdible 03,4 mapping.
One approach involves utilizing a group of experienced soldiers to consider a specified set of (presumably fremetric required for a successful completion of the mission. The notional outcome of this process is illustrated in Fig. 4 We invite the reader to study Comstock's results in detail; a brief overview is given here. This study involved configuring a small-unit force-level simulation to accept as V/L. input either a traditional SSPK type of input or a distribution of more rigorously defined Level 3) capability metrics consistent with the V/L taxonomy. This strategy permitted a comparison of exchange ratios and other metrics as a function of the V L input Unsurprisingly, Comstock concluded that the more rigorous metrics provided ". . . a fuller and more detailed picture of combat . . . ." Also, Bakerm showed that the procedures lead to results that are statistically dissimilar.
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Utility Mapping: Conclusions
All three of the problems mentioned previously in connection with force-level modeling are solved or at least mitigated in the Comstock experiment. All traces of "utility" are purged from the Level 31 metrics (and not, of course, from the SSPKs). Much more of the information is rctained in the Degraded States metrics than in the even more highly averaged SSPKs. Finally, the more rigorous methodology permits proper simulation of cases in which systems remain on the battlefield with some but not all of their original capability. This also provides support for wargame decisions based on reassignment of platlorm mission roles based on best match of roles. given new (reduced) capabilities.
Similar arguments could be made about a second experiment pursued by the Army Research Laboratory and the Training and Doctrine Command-White Sands Missile Range (TRAC-WSMR) Over the past few Although the results from that larger-scale force-level simulation have not yet bcen published, there appcar no insuperable obstacles to pursuing implementation. With the promise shown in force-level modeling expuimcnts sincc at least 19%. one might desire m m rapid progress. No initiative is cost-free, and even low-co~l initiaiives arc difficult to prosecute in a Defense downsizing environment. However, the delta cost on an ongoing business basis to work the force-level problem properly is mcdemte while the paential gain in information content high. We believe that there are no compelling reasons for not moving fonvard. 
